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POWER OF EQUITY TO ENJOIN TRESPASSES
TO REAL PROPERTY -REQUISITES FOR
TIlE GRANTING OF SUCH RELIEF
Baker v. Howard Hunt, et al.'
The complainants owned and resided upon a farm where
they conducted experiments in breeding animals and live-
stock, raised various crops, and engaged in other similar
activities. The respondents, an association of fox-hunters,
traversed, while hunting, a territory in which the complain-
ants' farm was located. It was alleged that on several
occasions the respondents had crossed the complainants'
farm in pursuit of foxes, trampling crops, frightening the
farm animals, and thereby disrupting the complainants' ex-
periments. It was further alleged that on one occasion one
of the complainants had been attacked by the hounds. In
spite of the notice given them and their promise to avoid
repetition of this conduct, the respondents apparently made
no serious effort to curb these activities. From an order
dismissing the bill for an injunction, the complainants ap-
pealed. Held: Reversed. The complainants are entitled
to an injunction as their remedy at law is inadequate be-
cause of conjectural damages and the possibility of multi-
plicity of suits.
Equity's jurisdiction in granting relief in trespass cases
arose out of its jurisdiction to enjoin waste. The earliest
known case in which a trespasser was enjoined was Fla-
mang's Case2 wherein the Chancellor, Lord Thurlow,
granted to the complainant-reversioner a decree enjoining
the commission of waste by a life tenant, and also enjoined
the commission of trespass by the tenant upon adjoining
property of the reversioner. Lord Thurlow held that while
equity would not enjoin trespass, yet in the particular case
trespass and waste were so intermingled that it was neces-
sary to enjoin both in order to grant to the complainant the
full relief to which he was entitled.
Beyond this limit courts of equity were extremely reluc-
tant to go. It was not until some thirty years later that a
trespasser was enjoined when his acts had no connection
with the commission of waste. In Thomas v. Oakleyl,3 Lord
Eldon enjoined a trespasser from quarrying rock upon the
complainant's land, basing his decision upon the similarity
1 171 Md. 159, 188 Atd. 223 (1936).
'6 Yes. 147 (1780).
S1 Ves. 184 (1811).
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of this injury and that which had been present in Flamang's
Case.' Thus the nature of the injury was recognized as the
basis for the granting of the injunction. In cases of tres-
pass as well as of waste, the nature of the injury may be
such that only in equity may the complainant receive an
adequate remedy. It is, of course, the inadequacy of the
complainant's remedy at law that causes equity to assume
jurisdiction in order that satisfactory relief may be
granted.5
The reluctance of the English Chancellors in granting
relief in cases of trespass was reflected iii early American
decisions. Thus, in the often cited case of Jerome v. Ross,'
Chancellor Kent refused to enjoin the removal, under color
of statute, of rock from the complainant's land and held
that in this, as in most trespass cases, damages at law con-
stituted an adequate remedy. The Chancellor said that
g.... only in strong, aggravated instances of trespass which
go to the destruction of the inheritance, or where the mis-
chief is remediless . . ." should equity intervene.
A somewhat broader view of what should be regarded as
the proper standard in determining the adequacy of the
remedy at law in cases involving trespass is stated by Story,
who lays down the rule that ". . . Courts of Equity inter-
fere in cases of trespass . . . to prevent irreparable mis-
chiefs, or to suppress multiplicity of suits and oppressive
litigation. . . . Formerly, indeed, Courts of Equity were ex-
tremely reluctant to interfere at all, even in regard to re-
peated trespasses. But now there is not the slightest hesi-
tation if the acts done or threatened to the property would
be ruinous or irreparable, or would impair the just enjoy-
ment of the property in the future. If, indeed, Courts of
Equity did not interfere in cases of this sort, there would
(as has been truly said) be a great failure of justice in this
country."1
In his "Equitable Remedies", s Pomeroy points out that
the scope of equity's jurisdiction in cases of trespass to real
property has been extended to cover cases including one or
more of the following elements: Irreparable injury,9 con-
' Supra note 2.
5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, (Fourth Edition), See. 1007. 14 B. C.
L., Sees. 143, 144, and 146. Miller, Equity Procedure, See. 157. Story,
Equity Jurisprudence, (Fourteenth Edition), Sec. 1258. Banks v. Bussey.
34 Md. 437 (1871). Cumberland and Pennsylvania R. R. Co., et al., 57 31d.
267 (1881). Whalen v. Delashmutt, 59 Md. 250 (1883).
'7 Johns. Ch. 407, 11 Am. Dec. 484 (1823).
'Equity Jurisprudence (Fourteenth Edition), See. 1258.
Ibid, beginning at See. 1907.
* Ibid, Sec. 1909.
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tinuing or repeated trespasses," insolvency on the part of
the respondent," impossibility of estimating the injury in
terms of money damages. 2 In the event that any of these
elements are present, the complainant is regarded as with-
out an adequate remedy at law.'
In the early Maryland case of Duval v. Waters," the
Chancellor recognized that in cases of trespass as well as of
waste, threatened irreparable injury to the inheritance is
not adequately compensable by damages at law. In that
case an injunction was granted pending the determination
of the disputed title.
An attempt to formulate a standard for measuring the
adequacy of a remedy at law in trespass cases is seen in
Amelung v. Seekamp.'5 The complainant, asserting a right
of user over the respondent's private road to the highway,
sought to enjoin the respondent's obstruction of the road.
A suit at law, brought by the complainant, was pending.
The court stated the rule, in negative form, that irreparable
injury, or multiplicity of suits, or some special circum-
stances must be shown in order to justify the issuing of an
injunction. Jerome v. Ross"6 and Story's "Equity Juris-
prudence"' 1 were cited with approval. An injunction was
refused on the ground that no irreparable injury was shown.
In George's Creek Coal and Iron Co. v. Detmold"8 it was held
that if the act complained of is one which has been held and
enjoyed, even though there is no threat of the destruction
of the physical substance of the estate, it may be enjoined
on the ground that irreparable injury is threatened. In
that case, the complainant, who had leased certain of his
lands to the respondent for the purpose of conducting min-
ing operations thereon with the right to cut timber on the
tract leased and upon adjoining lands as incidental to the
conduct of such operations, sought to enjoin the respon-
dent's cutting of timber for the purpose of operating a saw-
mill. The Court held that the cutting of timber on the tract
leased and upon the complainant's adjoining lands did not
constitute irreparable injury, for the cutting of timber had
been authorized and that it was only the purpose of the re-
spondent in so doing that rendered his acts objectionable.
10 Ibid, Sec. 1910.
31 Ibid, Sec. 1911.
Z Ibid, See. 1912.
23 See also 14 R. C. L., Sees. 145-148, 152-153. 156-159.
1, 1 Bland 569 (1827).0 G. & J. 468 (1838).
'Supra note 6.
,See Supra note 1.
1 -Md. Oh. 371 (1848).
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The general rule as stated in these cases has been followed
and stated in the same or similar language in numerous
other cases.1'
The definition of "irreparable injury" was clarified in
Shipley v. Ritter" and was extended somewhat beyond the
view expressed in Jerome v. Ross.2 1  In enjoining the cut-
ting of ornamental shade trees by a trespasser, the court
held that equity's jurisdiction depended, not upon the mone-
tary value of the property threatened, but upon a policy of
safeguarding the use and enjoyment of the estate from de-
struction by a trespasser in its character as so used and
enjoyed. "The owner is entitled to its just and reasonable
enjoyment, or to have full and complete remuneration for
being disturbed therein; and whenever the court can see
that the acts complained of are of a character, necessarily,
to affect permanently such use, and do not admit of perfect
pecuniary compensation, . . . it would be a denial of justice
not to stay the hand of the destroyed . ...
Thus, injury not admitting "of perfect pecuniary com-
pensation" is deemed irreparable and an action at law is an
inadequate remedy. If courts of law provide no means of
measuring damages to cover fully the peculiar or special
injury to which the complainant is exposed, an injunction
may issue.2
In the instant case, the trial court held," after citing Gil-
bert v. Arnold," that no irreparable injury was shown, as
the evidence indicated that no crops grew upon the com-
10 Hamilton v. Ely, 4 Gill 34 (1846). Cockey v. Carroll and Lawrenson,
4 Md. Ch. 344 (1849). Herr v. Beirbower, 3 Md. Ch. 456 (1851). Carlisle
v. Stevenson, 3 Md. Ch. 379 (1850). Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Co. v.
Young, 3 Md. 480 (1853). White v. Flannigan, I Mdi. 543 (1852). Green v.
Keen, 4 Md. 106 (1853). Shipley v. Rlitter, 7 Md. 408 (1855). Cherry v.
Stein, 11 Md. 1 (1858). Riddell v. Byron, 14 Md. 444 (1859). Ford v.
Groves, 29 Md. 187 (1868). Mayor, etc. of Frederick v. Groshon, 30 Md.
436 (1869). Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, 41 Md. 529 (1875). Whalen v. Dela-
shmutt, supra note 5. Schmidt v. Blaul, 66 Md. 141, 6 Atl. 669 (1886).
Baltimore Belt R. R. Co. v. Lee, 75 Md. 595, 23 Atl. 901 (1892). Long v.
Ragan, 94 Md. 462, 51 Atl 181 (1902). Carswell r. Swindell, 102 Md. 636,
62 Atl. 956 (190f). Chesapeake Co. v. Mt. Vernon Co., 107 Md. 532, 69 AU.
256 (1908). Didier v. Merryman, 114 Md. 434, 79 At. 597 (1911). Ober-
lieim. et al.. r. Reeside, et al.. 116 Md. 0265, 81 Atl. 590 (19111 Douglass v.
ntigin. 123 Md. 18. 90 AtL 1000 (1914). Levlnson and Zenltz v. Bonaparte,
131 Md. 634. 102 Md. 998 (1917). Waring v. Stinchcumb, 141 Md. 568, 119
Atl. 330 (1922). Cityco Realty Co. v. Slaysman, et al., 160 Md. 356, 153
At. 278 (1930).
"Supra note 19.
s Supra note 6.
22See also: Roman v. Strauss, 10 Md. 89 (1856). MeCreery v. Suther-
land, 23 Md. 471 (1856). Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall 74 (1866). Dudley
v. Hurst, 67 Md. 45, 8 At]. 901 (1887). Cityco Realty Co. v. Slaysman, et
al., supra note 19.
28 Baltimore Dally Record, April 30, 1936.2130 Md. 29 (1869).
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plainants' land during the hunting season. Inherent in the
opinion seems to be an adherence to the earlier definition of
irreparable injury as "destruction of the inheritance" or
of the physical substance of the estate. No other factors
which would render the complainants' remedy at law inade-
quate were considered in the opinion. Since the respon-
dents were financially responsible, the injunction was re-
fused." '
In the decision on appeal the Court of Appeals points
out that the complainants had the right to use and enjoy
their property in a lawful and reasonable manner and that
their exercise of that right appeared to have been both law-
ful and reasonable. On the other hand, the respondents
had the right to hunt, and in a very striking passage of the
opinion, the Court graphically describes the glamour, ex-
hilaration, and wholesomeness of the sport of fox-hunting.
But the right of the huntsman is subordinate to that of the
landowner; its enjoyment is conditioned upon non-interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment of the estate. If, as in this
case, huntsmen invade lands against the will of the owners
thereof, they are trespassers. The Court quoted the Eng-
lish case of Paul v. Summerhayes :"' " There is no principle
of the law that justifies trespassing over the lands of others
for the purpose of fox-hunting.."
The Court concluded that, for these trespasses, the com-
plainants have no adequate remedy at law. The principal
injuries are of an intangible character. Interference with
the complainants' conduct of stockbreeding and other ex-
periments is regarded as resulting in damage of such a char-
acter as not to be capable of satisfactory monetary evalua-
tion or compensation. The alleged physical damage, such
as the trampling of crops, which might be susceptible of
measurement in damages at law, was thought to be a minor
element of the wrong. Thus the Court indicated that the
element of irreparable injury was present.
. It is at least arguable that no irreparable injury actually
was shown by the complainants. As has already been
pointed out, the rule laid down in the earlier cases as to
what type or kind of damage might be classified in this
category was quite strict. Chancellor Kent did not regard
the severing and removal of rock from the complainants'
29 By statute, Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 87; Art. 26, Sec. 25, it is provided
that no injunction shall be refused on the ground that the complainant has
an adequate remedy at law unless the respondent can show that he is
financially responsible or unless he posts bond for damages and costs which
may be assessed against him at law.
"1 4 Q. B. D. 9 (1878).
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land as a wrong irremediable by an action at law.2" The
cutting of timber upon the complainant's estate was viewed
in George's Creck v. Detnmold,28 in Hainilton v. Ely,29 and in
Green v. Keen3" as adequately compensable in money dam-
ages. These cases illustrate the view that, in order to jus-
tify the issuance of an injunction, substantial physical de-
struction of the estate must be shown. Certainly, if this
definition of irreparable injury were literally accepted and
followed, as it apparently was by the trial court, such injury,
if present at all, is a negligible element in the case.
However, under the broader doctrine of some of the later
cases, interference with the reasonable use and enjoyment
of the estate, in the manner in which its owners seek to
utilize it, may also be considered irremediable damage, even
though little or no actual physical damage is inflicted. Thus,
under the view enunciated in Shipley v. Ritter,"1 it is not the
quantity or commercial value of the property destroyed
which renders the damage irreparable, but the effect of this
destruction as an interference With the enjoyment of the
estate. In Gilbert v. Arnold32 it was held that the respon-
dents' mere unauthorized use and occupancy of a church,
where there was no actual destruction of property shown,
entitled the trustees and members of the church to an injunc-
tion as this interference was not compensable in money dam-
ages. Injury which cannot be measured by any pecuniary
standard of value was viewed in Dudley v. Hurst8 3 as ir-
reparable. Under this view, an injunction on the ground of
irremediable damage might be justified as the facts showed
an interference with the complainants' use of their estate
resulting in damage of a nature so intarIgible that it could
not well be estimated by a jury in an action at law.
But there is another ground more strongly relied upon
by the court for holding that an injunction should issue.
The complainants' remedy at law is viewed as inadequate
because of the threat of repetition of the trespasses. There
is shown in this case a series of trespasses, not continuous,
but part of a single course of conduct, interfering with the
complainants' use and enjoyment of their property. Send-
ing the complainants to seek their remedy at law might well
result in multiple litigation for very meagre compensation.





2 Supra note 24.
"Supra note 22.
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Where there is a repetition of the acts complained of, or
a threat of repetition, or where the act is inflicting injury of
a continuing nature, it has frequently been stated in Mary-
land that an injunction will issue to prevent a multiplicity
of suits. There was a diversity of opinion among the au-
thorities as to the meaning of this term. Some earlier
cases, including Jer-ome v. Ross,"' seem to hold that if the
trespasses were committed by the same respondent against
whom the complainant's only redress was a separate action
for each invasion of his legal rights, this would not consti-
tute such a multiplicity of litigation as would justify the
issuance of an injunction. If a number of different per-
sons were responsible for the injuries to the complainant,
then the necessity of bringing separate actions at law
against these numerous parties would result in such a multi-
plicity of suits that equity's aid might be secured by the
complainant.u
A more liberal view holds that if the same trespasser or
group of trespassers repeats and manifests the intention
of further repetition of acts injurious to the complainant
or has committed acts which have resulted in a continuing
trespass a multiplicity of suits is threatened.86 A number
of Maryland cases have regarded a multiplicity of injuries
as well as a multiplicity of parties as a factor in rendering
the complainant's remedy at law, by numerous separate
suits, inadequate."
An examination of those decisions of the Maryland Court
of Appeals (prior to 1930) holding that the complainant was
entitled to an injunction against the repeated or continuing
trespasses complained of, and citing multiple litigation at
law as one ground for the granting of such relief, reveals
that in those cases irreparable injury also was considered
present. Indeed, in Whalen v. Delashmutt,88 where the
complainant had sought to enjoin the erection of a post upon
a strip of his land, the court held that irreparable injury
3, Supra note 6.
35 Walsh. Equity, See. 30; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Fourth Edi-
tion) See. 1910.
36 Ibid. See also: 32 C. J, Secs. 79-87, and 14 R. C. L, Sees. 50-55.
"7 Carlisle v. Stevenson. supra note 19. Amelung v. Seekamp, 9 G. & J.
468 (1838). White v. Flannigan, supra note 19. Shipley v. Ritter, supra
note 19. Gilbert v. Arnold, 30 Md. 29 (1869) ; Mayor etc. of Frederick v.
Groshon, supra note 19. Whalen v. Delashmutt, supra note 5. Baltimore
Belt B. R. Co. v. Lee. supra note 19. Blondell v. Consolidated Gas Co.. 89
Md. 732. 43 Atl. 817 (1889). Long v. Ragan, supra note 19. Chesapeake
Co. v. Mt. Vernon Co., 107 Md. 53, 69 Atl. 256 (1908). Waring v. Stinch-
comb, supra note 19. Cityco Realty Co. v. Slaysman, et al., supra note 19.
Is Supra note 5.
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was an element essential to justify the intervention of equity
to restrain a trespasser and that since such damage had not
been shown, no injunction would issue."
However, not quite fifty years after 1lhalcn v. Dela-
slzmutt had been decided, a majority of the Court of Ap-
peals held in Cityco Realty Co. v. Slayszat40 that the repe-
tition of trespasses by the respondent upon a strip of land
belonging to the complainant should be enjoined in order
that a multiplicity of suits might be prevented. No irrep-
arable injury had been shown and, upon this ground, there
was dissent which cited the rule of Whalen v. Delasbmutt.
Since it seems at least doubtful whether any irreparable
injury had been shown here, the instant case appears to
give much greater weight to the element of multiplicity of
suits than was given under the view expressed in Whalen v.
Delashmutt. The opinion does not. cite Cityco Realty Co. v.
Slaysman but, in effect, it adheres to the rule of the major-
ity in that case, and regards multiplicity of litigation not
simply as an incidental ground aggravating the principal
injury, but as a determining factor in rendering the com-
plainants' remedy at law inadequate..
The respondents contended that, under the doctrine of
Calvert v. Goslingq," no injunction should issue as there was
no evidence of an intention on their part to trespass upon
the complainants' land. This doctrine was rejected by the
court. Even though the intentions of the respondents might
have been good, equity's relief should not be barred, espe-
cially where the evidence showed that the respondents per-
mitted the pack so far to escape from their control that it
became impossible to prevent the hounds from going where
the respondents did not wish them to go. Although the
court cited with approval Pomeroy's rule42 that, where the
defendant manifests an intent or purpose to persist in his
unlawful acts, the threat of repetition will justify the issu-
ance of an injunction, the court seems to be holding, in effect,
that intent to commit the particular act is not material. It
is sufficient if the respondent intends to persist in a course
of conduct that will render possible the repetition of such
trespasses.
On these grounds, namely, the difficulty of estimating the
injuries in terms of money damages and the threat of repe-
tition which would give rise to a multiplicity of suits, the
:$See also, Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, supra note 19.
40 Supra note 19.
415 Times L. R. 185, Q. B.. D.
42 Loc. cit. supra note 35.
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court held that the complainant3 were without an adequate
remedy at law. Therefore, the decision of the court below
was reversed and the cause was remanded for appropriate
relief.
While the result appears to be an extension of the doc-
trines of some of the earlier Maryland cases, the decision
seems to be in accord with the overwhelming weight of
American authority. 3 A typical expression of the views
of the majority was voiced in West Virginia Pulp and Paper
Co. v. Cheat Mountain Club," where it was said with regard
to continuing and repeated trespasses that ". . . one per-
son cannot take the property of another without his consent
or continually trespass upon it and compel the owner to
accept paymrent of money in satisfaction. The rule applies
with special force where the threatened trespass would re-
sult in depriving the complainant of the enjoyment of a
property right."
WHO MAY SUE FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
CAUSED AND OCCURRING OUTSIDE
THE STATE OF THE FORUM
Rose v. Phillips Packing Co., Inc.'
The plaintiff, a Virginia citizen, appointed as adminis-
tratrix of the estate of her infant son in Virginia, sued the
defendant, a Maryland corporation, in the United States
District Court for Maryland, basing her claim on the Vir-
ginia wrongful death statute. The son's death was caused
by eating canned herring, alleged to have been negligently
prepared and sold by the defendant, the wrongful act taking
effect and the death occurring in Virginia. The declaration
(in several counts) was demurred to (among other grounds)
on the arguments: "(1) that the Virginia statute should
not be enforced in Maryland by reason of dissimilarity to
the Maryland statutory form of Lord Campbell's Act; (2)
that the suit in Maryland may not be maintained by a for-
eign administratrix; ..." After the beginning of the suit,
the Virginia administratrix took out ancillary letters in
Maryland and asked leave to be made a party plaintiff in
"3 See cases collected In notes In : 32 A. L. R. 463; 92 A. L. R. 578; 14 R.
C. L., Sees. 143-148, 152-154, 156-159, and the additional annotations at 5
R. C. L. Permanent Supplement.
"212 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. Fourth Circuit 1914).
'21 Fed. Supp. 485 ( 1. . Md. 1%37).
